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INTRODUCTION
As I contemplated the focus of this conference, issues about the
nature of the rights that are the subject of a deal stood out to me. A
good deal of my recent work has focused on challenges in
determining the scope of IP rights. And since those rights are the
inputs to various kinds of transactions—or, perhaps even more
importantly, ability to assess the scope of a right affects whether a
transaction is needed—I’m going to focus here on the relationship
between the scope of IP rights and potential IP transactions.
There is already quite a bit of scholarship on the importance of
clarity of property rights, both in giving notice to others as to how
to avoid the rights and in helping structure transactions. For
*

© 2018 Mark P. McKenna.
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These remarks were given as the keynote talk at The Art and Science of the Deal
Conference at the University of Washington School of Law. Thanks to Zahr Said
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Jessica Silbey for helpful discussions of the ideas in these remarks.
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example, Henry Smith has emphasized the importance of
standardized forms of property,1 and Mike Meurer and Jim Bessen
have argued that the social value of patents is a function of the clarity
of the property rights.2 My colleague Steve Yelderman has written
about the value of accuracy in the patent system—and particularly
its relation to incentives.3 But it’s notable that this literature focuses
primarily—perhaps even overwhelmingly—on utility patent law,
particularly patent claim scope,4 as evidenced by the extensive
literature on patent claim construction.5
I’m going to suggest that the problem may be more pervasive
than people have thought, in part because there generally has not
been enough focus on claiming outside of utility patent,6 or on
problems relating to scope. So I will focus here on two related
dimensions of the problem: (1) disparate claiming methodologies
across areas of intellectual property (IP); and (2) the ways our legal
system determines and enforces the scope of a party’s rights. I’m
going to address these in the context of design. I don’t do that
because I think it’s the only context in which these issues arise, but
because the problems may be the worst there, and because there are
some particular features of our legal treatment of design that
combine to exacerbate the problems.
1

See Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating
Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742 (2007).
2
See generally JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL MEURER, PATENT FAILURE:
HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008).
3
Stephen Yelderman, The Value of Accuracy in the Patent System, 84 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1217 (2017).
4
See, e.g., Janet Freilich, The Uninformed Topography of Patent Scope, 19
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 150, 152–53 (2015); Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro,
Optimal Patent Length and Breadth, 21 RAND J. ECON. 106 (1990); Paul
Klemperer, How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?, 21 RAND J.
ECON. 113 (1990); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex
Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990).
5
See, e.g., Dan Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts?
Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743 (2009); Timothy
R. Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 IND. L.J. 779, 809
(2011); Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104
MICH L. REV. 101, 119–21 (2005).
6
Jeanne Fromer’s excellent work is the obvious exception here. See Jeanne
C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719 (2009).
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What makes design such a unique and important context for
discussion is that it is highly unusual in the extent of overlapping
protection. Obviously, I don’t mean that it’s the only subject matter
that implicates multiple forms of intellectual property protection.
But design is unusual, if not absolutely unique, because in most of
the other contexts of overlapping protection, different IP regimes
deal with different aspects of a product. To take the example of
software—utility patent deals with the functional aspects, while
copyright deals with the non-functional, expressive aspects of the
code.7 As much of Pam Samuelson’s work has shown, that division
between the functional and non-functional isn’t always perfect, just
as the distinctions are not perfect in any of the contexts in which
different rights might apply to different aspects of the same
commercial product.8 But in all of those other contexts, courts have
developed substantial doctrine that aims to channel protection of
particular aspects of the work to the right regime.9
Design is different. It is relatively common for parties to claim
multiple forms of legal protection, not for different parts, but for
exactly the same features of a design.10 Indeed, complaints regularly
allege both design patent infringement and trade dress infringement
based on copying of the exact same features.11 In light of the
7

Dennis S. Karjala, The Relative Roles of Patent and Copyright in the
Protection of Computer Programs, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 41,
41–42 (1998).
8
For a thorough discussion of the respective roles of utility patent and
copyright in the software context, see Pamela Samuelson, Functionality and
Expression in Computer Programs: Refining the Tests for Software Copyright
Infringement, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1215 (2017). See also Pamela
Samuelson, Strategies for Discerning the Boundaries of Copyright and Patent
Protections, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1493 (2017).
9
See Mark P. McKenna & Katherine J. Strandburg, Progress and
Competition in Design, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2014) (describing IP law’s
utility patent supremacy principle, by which IP law tries to channel functional
features to utility patent law).
10
Or at least probably the same features—given different claiming
methodologies, it’s often hard to tell. See Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark P. McKenna,
Claiming Design, 167 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).
11
See e.g., Jenny Yoo Collection, Inc. v. David's Bridal, Inc., 1:16 –cv–02647
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2016) (alleging trade dress and design patent infringement in
designs of convertible bridesmaid’s dresses); Deckers Outdoor Corp. v. J.C.
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Supreme Court’s recent Star Athletica decision,12 I suspect we are
going to see copyright asserted much more frequently as well. In
fact, just after Star Athletica was decided, Puma filed a lawsuit
against Forever 21 over these “Bow Slides”—alleging design
patent, trade dress, and copyright infringement.13

Figure 1: Image Comparison of Puma’s “Bow Slide” Slipper to
Forever 21’s “Bow Slide” Slipper.
Each of those areas of law—design patent, trademark, and
copyright—makes some effort to channel protection of the
functional features of design to utility patent. But beyond that, our
IP system is largely comfortable with overlapping protection for the
nonfunctional aspects of design. That overlap, as Jeanne Fromer and
I discuss in a current project,14 means that strategic parties can use
different forms of IP additively or as substitutes for each other—and
they can do so much more effectively than can parties claiming
Penney Co. Inc., 45 F. Supp. 3d 1181 (C.D. Cal. 2014). Courts have explicitly
endorsed these overlapping claims. See Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632,
638 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[A] product's different qualities can be protected
simultaneously, or successively, by more than one of the statutory means for
protection of intellectual property.”).
12
Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017).
13
Puma SE v. Forever 21, Inc., No. 2:17–cv–02523 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2017).
14
Fromer & McKenna, supra note 10.
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rights in just about any other subject matter.
One reason courts have not been able to manage that overlap
effectively is that the claiming methodologies of design patent,
trademark, and copyright differ significantly. In fact, there are some
pervasive issues with design claiming that complicate application of
design patent, trademark, and copyright doctrines and make it very
difficult for others to evaluate the scope of a party’s claims relating
to a design. These claiming problems also make it harder for courts
to give valid rights the correct scope—which is in turn made worse
by the way courts tend to structure their approach to validity and
infringement. As Mike Madison would say, all of these areas of law
struggle to identify and delineate the boundaries of the relevant legal
thing.15
I. CLAIMING METHODOLOGY16
Let me begin by talking about three issues relating to claiming
methodology in design patent, trademark and copyright: (1)
differences in the timing of the claims; (2) differences in the format
of the claims, and particularly the relative emphasis on visual and
verbal identification of the claimed features; and (3) a pervasive
level of abstraction problem.
A. Design Patent
Like utility patents, design patents do not exist until the Patent
Office issues them. Design patent claims are submitted to the Patent
Office as part of the application, independent of a dispute with any
alleged infringer. That means that, while claiming is strategic in the
sense that applicants draft claims with an eye toward the anticipated
conduct of other market participants, they generally cannot draft
those claims in reaction to a particular third-party use. Once issued,
a design patent provides a “definitive” record of a party’s claim
which, at least in theory, binds the party in all assertions of rights.
15

See Michael J. Madison, Law as Design: Objects, Concepts and Digital
Things, 56 CASE WESTERN L. REV. 381 (2005).
16
Remarks in this section are adapted from Fromer & McKenna, supra note
10.

6
14:1

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS

[VOL.

Notably, design patent claims are visual.17 At the Patent Office,
they are usually only visual; applicants can include some textual
material that explains or limits the claim, but the claim itself is an
image.18 Because a design patent can only issue for the design of an
article of manufacture, but a party need not claim the design of the
entire article, parties use solid lines to identify claimed features and
dotted lines to indicate the portions that are not claimed and depicted
only for context.19 That means, of course, that reading a design
patent entails visual interpretation.

Figure 2: Design Patent D599,999.
Visual interpretation remains important, at least formally, when
courts are evaluating validity and/or infringement, though there is
an interesting and important outlier here, namely nonobviousness,
where the Federal Circuit explicitly requires courts to render the
17

U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE § 1502 (9th ed. 7th rev., Nov. 2015) [hereinafter MPEP] (“The design
for an article consists of the visual characteristics embodied in or applied to an
article.”).
18
37 C.F.R. § 1.153(a) (2012).
19
MPEP, supra note 17, at § 1503.2, ¶ 15.49 (“The two most common uses
of broken lines are to disclose the environment related to the claimed design and
to define the bounds of the claim. Structure that is not part of the claimed design,
but is considered necessary to show the environment in which the design is
associated, may be represented in the drawing by broken lines.”)
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claimed design verbally in order to compare it to prior art.20
Apparently that comparison can be done perfectly well without
verbal elaboration when the issue is novelty, but not in the context
of nonobviousness.21
Courts in design patent cases emphasize the visual because of
their concern that deconstruction and verbal description will
inevitably focus decisionmakers too much on individual features
rather than the overall creativity of a composite design. 22 That
concern is not unique to design patent law, of course – we see it in
the “overall look and feel” cases in copyright,23 and as we’ll see, the
issue arises in trademark law too.24 Concern for the overall design
pushes courts to give visual representation priority.
But it turns out to be essentially impossible to maintain that
exclusive focus on visual claims, because drawings actually don’t
speak for themselves when designs must be compared to prior art or
allegedly infringing products, and when courts have to give reasons
for their determinations about whether those comparators are
sufficiently similar to the claimed design to meet the legal standard.
As a result, notwithstanding their repeated insistence that the visual
takes priority, courts can’t resist describing the designs verbally.
One important reason for the persistence of verbal description is
that designs often include features or collections of features that,
standing alone, wouldn’t be protectable – because they are not new,
20

See High Point Design LLC v. Buyers Direct, Inc., 730 F.3d 1301 (Fed.
Cir. 2013).
21
Cf. Rebecca Tushnet, The Eye Alone Is the Judge: Images and Design
Patents, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 409 (2012) (critiquing translation of images to
verbal descriptions).
22
See Crocs, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 598 F.3d 1294, 1302 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (“Depictions of the claimed design in words can easily distract from the
proper infringement analysis of the ornamental patterns and drawings.”); see also
Egyptian Goddess v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 679–80 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
23
See, e.g., Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc.,
338 F.3d 127, 134 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Essentially, the total-concept-and-feel locution
functions as a reminder that, while the infringement analysis must begin by
dissecting the copyrighted work into its component parts in order to clarify
precisely what is not original, infringement analysis is not simply a matter of
ascertaining similarity between components viewed in isolation.”); see also Roth
Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970).
24
See infra Part I.B.
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or because they are functional. Those design features are only
protectable when used in the particular overall design, and the risk
of gestalt comparison is that infringement might be found based on
similarity that is attributable only to the unprotectable parts.25 Courts
are aware of that problem, and as a result, validity decisions—those
dealing with ornamentality, novelty, and of course
nonobviousness—nearly always include verbal descriptions, even if
not acknowledged as such.
International Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens provides just
one example.26 In that case, the court compared the claimed design
in the ‘263 patent to the prior art design in the ‘789 patent.

Figure 3: Image Comparison of the ‘263 Patent to the Prior Art
Design in the ‘789 Patent.
In doing so, the court could not help but to highlight the long,
U-shaped dimpling pattern on the insole of the design in the ‘789
patent, which it contrasted with the multiple short rows of dimples
depicted in the ‘263 patent.27 That difference, it believed, might be
25

See Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Scope, 57 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 2197, 2206–07 (2016).
26
589 F.3d 1233 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
27
Id. at 1242–43.

2018]

REMARKS ON THE PROBLEM OF SCOPE IN IP

9

significant in the eyes of the ordinary observer armed with the
knowledge of the prior art. By contrast, the court was confident that
slight variations in the number and position of the circular holes on
the top of the respective shoes, differences in the rectangular holes
on the toes of the shoes, and differences in the shapes of the
rectangles on the soles of the shoes were all so minor that they
wouldn’t have had any effect on the ordinary observer.28
Comparisons are particularly difficult in the infringement
context because they necessarily entail comparison of an accused
product—typically a physical object—with the patent drawing,
which might claim only partially. Because comparing a real object
to a drawing is not comparing like to like, interpretation is inherently
necessary. Obviously that challenge can sometimes arise in novelty
and obviousness comparisons, but it does not always do so, since
the universe of prior art includes prior patents and publications.29
To help with the infringement comparison, courts used to line
up the accused product, the claimed design, and the closest prior art
in order to identify the point of novelty in the claimed design—the
feature or features that made the design patentable over the prior
art.30 The point was to assure that the accused design was similar to
the patented design in terms of those features. So rather than simply
looking at the accused design side by side with the patented design,
as in Figure 4, one could have some context against which to
evaluate elements of similarity, as in Figure 5.

28

Id. at 1243.
MPEP, supra note 17, at § 1501(a)(1) (“Prior art consisting of patents or
printed publications which the person making the submission believes to have a
bearing on the patentability of any claim of the patent . . .”).
30
See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 836 F.2d 521, 527 (Fed. Cir.
1987); see also Applied Arts Corp. v. Grand Rapids Metalcraft Corp., 67 F.2d
428, 430 (6th Cir. 1933).
29
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Figure 4: Image Comparison of Defendant’s Nebelli Bench Design
to Plaintiff’s Design Patent D523,263.31

Figure 5: Image Comparison of Defendant’s Nebelli Bench to
Plaintiff’s Design Patent D523,263 and Prior Art design
D419,341.32
Sometimes that three-way comparison served to highlight
particular similarities, as in the bench example. Often, however, a
three-way comparison drew out dissimilarities or highlighted the
fact that the similarities were only with respect to common,
unprotectable elements.

31

Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., No. CIV.A. MJG–06–2662,
2011 WL 4596043, at *19 (D. Md. Sept. 30, 2011), aff'd, 499 F. App’x 971 (Fed.
Cir. 2013).
32
Id.
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Figure 6: Image Comparison from Coca-Cola Co. v. Whistle Co. of
America, 20 F.2d 955, 957 (D. Del. 1927).
But we no longer use this point of novelty approach, nor do we
explicitly require a comparison with the closest piece of prior art.
While the infringement comparison is still supposed to be made in
light of the prior art, post-Egyptian Goddess, courts are no longer to
identify and describe the point of novelty.33 They are instead just
33

See Egyptian Goddess v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(“Our rejection of the point of novelty test does not mean, of course, that the
differences between the claimed design and prior art designs are irrelevant. To the
contrary, examining the novel features of the claimed design can be an important
component of the comparison of the claimed design with the accused design and
the prior art. But the comparison of the designs, including the examination of any
novel features, must be conducted as part of the ordinary observer test, not as part
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supposed to assume that the decisionmaker will notice differences
between the claimed design and the prior art and take them into
account.
Nevertheless, even in infringement cases, unless we are to throw
the comparison entirely to a jury and not require any stated reasons
for the similarity determination, it shouldn’t be a surprise that we
still see lots of verbal articulation of a claimed design, and
descriptions of the similarities and differences between the accused
product and that claimed design.34 Indeed, Egyptian Goddess gives
courts continuing discretion to use verbal description if they think it
would be helpful.35 But there is an enormous level of generality
problem here, in significant part because courts exercise that
discretion in the shadow of a rule that formally warns them away
from doing verbal description at all. Courts engaged in the practice
of verbally describing things that they purport not to be describing
do so at quite different levels of generality, a problem of which the
Federal Circuit essentially washed its hands when it held that the
level of generality is a matter of discretion.36 Sometimes the Federal
Circuit determines that district courts’ verbal comparisons operate
at too high a level of abstraction, failing to highlight the design
elements,37 but other times equally or more abstract descriptions
seem fine.38 Without any methodology for determining the
appropriate level of generality, it’s very difficult to know how to
evaluate similarities or differences in any systematic way.
To summarize, design patent claiming has the virtue of early
claiming independent of a dispute, giving at least the sense of a
stable public record. But the claiming is in the form of images.
Images in general—and even more these kinds of images in
particular—beg courts for description in order to do comparison.
When courts have to make comparisons for validity or infringement
purposes, it turns out that verbal description is inevitable. Yet these
of a separate test focusing on particular points of novelty that are designated only
in the course of litigation.”).
34
See, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 678 F.3d 1314, 1328–33 (Fed.
Cir. 2012).
35
Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 679.
36
Id.
37
See, e.g., Apple, 678 F.3d at 1328–33
38
See, e.g., MRC Innovations, Inc. v. Hunter Mfg., LLP, 747 F.3d 1326,
1332–36 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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descriptions are wildly inconsistent and lacking in any clear
methodology. The notice value of the ex ante design patent claim is
actually quite questionable.
In a world with an extremely tight infringement standard, and
particularly one in which functionality plays a significant limiting
role, that might not be a significant problem. But, in my judgment,
the infringement standard has broadened over time to the point that
I don’t think it can be said anymore in the context of design patent
that “that which infringes, if it later, anticipates if earlier.”39 And I
think the Federal Circuit has largely eliminated functionality as a
constraint.40
B. Trademark
In the trademark context, we formally have a dual regime with
registered and unregistered marks.41 Registered marks appear to
share with design patents the fact that they have a definitive claim
made prior to, and independent of, any particular dispute. The
Trademark Office has pretty elaborate rules about the form in which
the mark is to be depicted—often requiring verbal elaboration of the
design elements of the mark in addition to the description of goods
and services.42
But that really overstates things in a couple of important ways.
First, most trade dress—particularly of the product configuration
variety—is not registered, so any notice value a registration might
provide is lacking, at least in most litigated cases. And second, the
form of the registration really doesn’t matter in the context of a
dispute; courts focus overwhelmingly on the nature of the parties’
uses in the marketplace.43 As a result, registration provides only a
weak form of notice.
39
Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1239 (Fed.
Cir. 2009) (quoting Peters v. Active Mfg. Co., 129 U.S. 530, 537 (1889)).
40
See, e.g., Sport Dimension, Inc. v. Coleman Co., Inc., 820 F.3d 1316,
1320–21 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
41
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–52 (2012) (providing for registration of marks and
grounds for refusal of registration); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (providing causes of
action for registered and unregistered marks, respectively).
42
See MPEP, supra note 17, at §§ 807–809.
43
See Rebecca Tushnet, Registering Disagreement: Registration in Modern
American Trademark Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 867, 907 (2017).
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Of course, in many cases involving registered marks, and even
in cases involving unregistered marks, the claimant has used the
design in the market, and that use itself provides some bit of notice.
Particularly in the context of product configuration, however, usebased notice is very poor because these complex designs include a
number of features which are not themselves protectable. And trade
dress often changes over time, forcing parties to identify the features
that remain consistent and therefore potentially protectable.
Courts understandably are uncomfortable about allowing parties
simply to refer to their trade dress or even just to depict it, and most
courts now require—often as a matter of pleading—that a trade
dress claimant verbally describe the claimed trade dress so as to
identify the features.44 It’s worth noting here that courts have done
this only in trade dress cases, even though one might have the same
notice concerns much more broadly—especially when it comes to
other visual matter that isn’t trade dress. But perhaps because trade
dress highlights the risk of functionality, courts are more sensitive
to this issue here.
In any event, at least as implemented now, this verbal
description requirement doesn’t work very well. The most basic
issue is the level of generality problem. Even when courts require
parties to describe the trade dress verbally, there is no agreement,
and certainly no consistent practice, as to the level of generality at
which they require the trade dress to be described. Thus in

44

See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Lanard Toys, Inc., 468 F.3d 405, 415 (6th
Cir. 2006) (“In requiring a list of discrete elements, we are looking to avoid vague
and indeterminate references to the overall appearance or look of plaintiff ’s
packaging.”); Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 116–17 (2d Cir.
2001) (“[W]e hold that a plaintiff seeking to protect its trade dress in a line of
products must articulate the design elements that compose the trade dress.”);
Heller Inc. v. Design Within Reach, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 1909 (JGK), 2009 WL
2486054, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2009) (“The plaintiff alleges that because ‘a
picture is worth a thousand words,’ the images ‘without a doubt provide the most
precise definition of the protected trade dress possible.’ However, images alone
do not satisfy the plaintiff’s obligation to articulate the distinctive features of the
trade dress.”); Nat’l Lighting Co. v. Bridge Metal Indus., LLC, 601 F. Supp. 2d
556, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that the court could not be expected to distill
from a set of images those elements that are common to a line of products and
both distinctive and non–functional).
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Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co.,45 the Second
Circuit rejected as too abstract a description of site furniture that
“incorporates large three-inch tubing, with a powdered cosmetic
finish, bent in gentle turns that roll around the perimeter of the
furniture which in combination with the various seating surfaces
gives the viewer a floating or suspended feeling.”46 Meanwhile in
the famous Two Pesos case,47 the court accepted this description:
a festive eating atmosphere having interior dining
and patio areas decorated with artifacts, bright
colors, paintings and murals. The patio includes
interior and exterior areas with the interior patio
capable of being sealed off from the outside patio by
overhead garage doors. The stepped exterior of the
building is a festive and vivid color scheme using top
border paint and neon stripes. Bright awnings and
umbrellas continue the theme.48
The verbal description requirement does constrain parties’
claiming in some cases, because a party that claims too broadly risks
describing a trade dress for which it will have trouble satisfying
trademark law’s protectability requirements of distinctiveness49 or
nonfunctionality.50 At the extreme, courts sometimes do not even
recognize vague or underspecified claims as describing trade dress
at all.51 But because courts are often reluctant to invalidate, they will
45

113 F.3d 373 (2d Cir. 1997).
Id. at 381.
47
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
48
Id. at 765.
49
See Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 39–45
(1st Cir. 2001).
50
See Wallace Int’l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., Inc., 916
F.2d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Wallace seeks trademark protection, not for a precise
expression of a decorative style, but for basic elements of a style that is part of the
public domain. As found by the district court, these elements are important to
competition in the silverware market.”).
51
See, e.g., Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. State Farm Lloyds, 791 F.3d
561, 566–67 (5th Cir. 2015) (finding that plaintiff failed to assert a trade dress
infringement claim despite allegations that defendant created a “confusingly
similar web site” because the “alleged confusion . . . stems from the use of a
46
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typically narrow the claims or try to define the rights appropriately
themselves,52 so there is often little downside to claiming broadly
and strategically.
Take the example of another recently filed case in which Lisa
Frank, a company that makes various school supplies, stickers, and
other products for kids, sued Orb Factory, which sells similar
products under its Plushcraft mark.53 A representative sampling of
Lisa Frank’s products look like this:

Figure 7: Images of Lisa Frank’s Products.
Compare these samples to the extraordinarily broad way Lisa
Frank described its trade dress in its complaint:
the combination of some or all of the following
elements, depending upon the product and its
packaging, that create a unique overall image and
distinct visual impression . . . (1) brightly colored
similar service mark (‘Testmasters‘), and the false representation that TES offers
a similar service (live LSAT courses offered nationwide)”); Fair Wind Sailing,
Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 309–11 (3d Cir. 2014) (dismissing the plaintiff’s
claim for trade dress infringement when it had claimed only (1) “a hodgepodge of
unconnected pieces of its businesses,” which did not “together . . . comprise any
sort of composite visual effect” and (2) “web design,” without further specificity).
52
See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 25, at 2224–2266 (reviewing
doctrines in copyright, trademark, and patent law developed to address issues of
scope).
53
Lisa Frank, Inc. v. Orb Factory Ltd., No. 15–cv–00433, at *8 (D. Ariz.
Sept. 16, 2015).
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bold graphics of distinctive animal characters
depicted individually or grouped with one or more
other such characters, with rainbow colored features,
large eyes, and happy, friendly expressions; (2) use
of brilliant, often rainbow sequenced, colors,
graduated color sequences, and rainbow colors that
fade into one another . . .; (3) package, cover and
product surface designs featuring, in addition to the
distinctive animal characters, combinations of
rainbows, flowers, ice cream cones, butterflies, birds,
rabbits, fish, cupcakes, bubbles, peace symbols,
random words, hearts, happy faces, and stars, often
in groups including colorful backgrounds employing
rainbow colors, color fades and Lisa Frank pink,
props and landscape features such as trees, pools, and
snow; and (4) product packaging incorporating the
look and feel of the products.54
Not incidentally, the Orb Factory products to which Lisa Frank
refers in the complaint look like this:55

Figure 8: Images of Orb Factory’s Allegedly Infringing
Products.
As a result of this generality problem, the descriptions trade
dress plaintiffs give frequently fail to provide significant notice.
Perhaps more importantly, courts do not tend to structure the
54
55

Id. at *5.
Id. at *9.
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validity phase of the case in order to identify the particular aspects
of the complex design to which source designation is attributable—
which, to foreshadow a bit, makes it very hard to enforce anything
about the scope of the rights.56
There is some incentive to claim clearly non-functional aspects
of trade dress as courts increasingly interpret the Supreme Court’s
TrafFix decision to require a finding of functionality whenever the
claimed features are not “ornamental, incidental, or arbitrary”57—
that is to say, not entirely unrelated to function.58 But that’s only true
in cases where courts recognize the utilitarian functionality of some
of the claimed features, and the level of generality of the claim has
much to say about whether that will happen.
As a result, in comparison to design patent, claims in trademark
law are anchored by a party’s actual use, supplemented formally and
necessarily by verbal description.59 In practice, however, these
claims don’t do much to help better define the features of the trade
dress that are protectable, and in fact sometimes obscure more than
they illuminate.
And of course this is only to flag problems with notice relating
to the nature of the trade dress itself—not including issues relating
to the contexts in which that trade dress has source significance,
geographic scope of rights, or anything else that might be relevant
to notice of the scope of rights.
C. Copyright
Claiming in copyright has many of the same problems I’ve
already identified: the copyrighted work serves as the exemplar, but
it doesn’t give very much notice in many cases because the work

56

See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 25, at 2251–53.
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 30 (2001).
58
Groeneveld Transp. Efficiency, Inc. v. Lubecore Intern., Inc., 730 F.3d
494, 505 (6th Cir. 2013); Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 678 F.3d 1314, 1323
(Fed. Cir. 2012); Specialized Seating, Inc. v. Greenwich Indus. L.P., 616 F.3d
722, 726–28 (7th Cir. 2010); Eppendorf–Netheler–Hinz GMBH v. Ritter GMBH,
289 F.3d 351, 355 (5th Cir. 2002).
59
See Lisa Frank, Inc. v. Orb Factory Ltd., No. 15–cv–00433 at *6 (D. Ariz.
Sept 16, 2015); see also id. at *8.
57
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frequently incorporates many uncopyrightable features;60
registration doesn’t require identification of the specific elements
claimed;61 further delineation only occurs in litigation;62 and, in the
context of design, copyright suffers from all the same visual/verbal
challenges as those previously discussed.63 In some respects, these
problems are even worse in copyright because copyright worries
even less about claiming methodology than do design patent and
trademark law.
But I think it is worth noting that Star Athletica64 puts additional
pressure on claiming in cases involving useful articles—which is to
say, most cases of design. The most obvious claiming issue relates
to the uncertainty about whether Varsity was claiming the design of
various chevrons and lines by themselves, or the designs of the
uniforms of which the chevrons were merely features. The Supreme
Court majority accepted that Varsity claimed a two-dimensional
design that was applied to the useful article of the cheerleading
uniform.65 But it is hardly obvious that is so, and the correct
understanding of Varsity’s claim seems to me to turn at least in part
on whether we are to emphasize the visual deposit copy or the
plaintiff’s characterization of that design.

See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 25, at 2227 (“[I]n general, copyright
law only rarely disqualifies works altogether and instead generally relies on
infringement doctrine to limit the scope of rights in a work so that it reflects that
work’s marginal copyrightability.”); Fromer, supra note 6, at 745.
61
Copyright Basics, UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, (last visited Jun.
15, 2017), available at https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ01.pdf#page=7.
62
Fromer, supra note 6, at 746.
63
For discussions of the difficulties courts have in evaluating nonwritten
works in IP, see, for example, Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The
Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683 (2012); Jessica Silbey, Evidence
Verité and the Law of Film, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1257 (2010); Jessica M. Silbey,
Judges as Film Critics: New Approaches to Filmic Evidence, 37 U. MICH. J. L.
REFORM 493 (2004).
64
Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017).
65
Id. at 1008.
60
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As Justice Breyer suggested, look at the designs Varsity
registered:66

Figure 9: Image Comparison of Varsity’s Registered Designs.67
The majority’s characterization of these as drawings of various
features in some arrangement68 ignores the reality of the images
submitted to the Copyright Office. They are not simply depictions
of chevrons—they are pictures of uniforms that have particular
design features. But registration does not require a clear statement
on this score.
To complicate matters further, the same visual image could
reflect two different types of claims. One might, for example, make
a model of a car and submit an image of that model to claim rights
in the model of the car. As Justice Thomas noted, the model of the
car is copyrightable, even if it cannot be enforced against a party
that makes an actual car.69 Yet one could also characterize an image
of a car in the same way Varsity described its uniforms in order to
claim design features that might be—in the majority’s language—
66

Id. at 1036 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1016 (appendix to the opinion of the court).
68
Id. at 1008–09 (“In this case, our task is to determine whether the
arrangements of lines, chevrons, and colorful shapes appearing on the surface of
respondents' cheerleading uniforms are eligible for copyright protection as
separable features of the design of those cheerleading uniforms.”).
69
Id. at 1010.
67
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“applied to” the car itself.70 The very same sorts of images could be
used to lay claim to a particular depiction of a car, but not a car, or
to features of an actual car, at least as long as those features could
be “imagined” separately from the car.71 That might be acceptable
if ordinarily the copyright registration process forced a party to
delineate its claim – identifying which features of the submitted
work it claimed, and for what purpose. But typically, the Copyright
Office does not require anything like that, and the claim will be
defined, if at all, in litigation.
That brings me to the second issue. The majority opinion makes
separability turn on whether features of a useful article can be
imagined separately as a work of authorship that is not itself a useful
article.72 But what features are we to “imagine” separately, and how
do we know whether those features can be recognized as a work of
authorship or, alternatively, simply depict the useful article?
The majority isn’t very clear on either one of those things,
having simply accepted that the features in that case were a series of
chevrons and other lines arranged in some format. But actually the
question must turn on which features the plaintiff claims should be
imagined separately. Here we see a problem very much like the
others we’ve seen in other contexts.
At various points during the litigation, Varsity verbally
described the aspects of this design it thought were copyrightable:
“the lines, stripes, coloring, angles, V’s [or chevrons], and shapes
and the arrangement and placement of those elements.”73 Courts at
every level of the litigation basically accepted that description,
similarly characterizing Varsity’s copyright claim as relating to
“graphic features of Varsity’s designs—the arrangement of stripes,
70

Id. at 1005.
Id. at 1012 (“In sum, a feature of the design of a useful article is eligible
for copyright if, when identified and imagined apart from the useful article, it
would qualify as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work either on its own or when
fixed in some other tangible medium.”).
72
Id. at 1010.
73
Id. at 1018 (emphasizing “the lines, stripes, coloring, angles, V’s and
shapes and the arrangement and placement of those elements”); cf. id. at 1007
(referring to all five designs as “compris[ing] original combinations, positionings,
and arrangements of elements which include V’s (chevrons), lines, curves, stripes,
angles, diagonals, inverted V’s, coloring, and shapes, etc.”).
71
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chevrons, zigzags, and color-blocking.”74
But when Varsity needed to describe the designs to the
Copyright Office in order to overcome the Office’s initial rejection,
its description was much more specific:
Design 538 . . . has a central field of black bordered
at the bottom by a gray/white/black multistripe
forming a shallow “vee” of which the left-hand leg is
horizontal, while the right-hand leg stretches
“northeast” at approximately a forty-five degree
angle. Below the upward-angled leg of the shallow
“vee” is a similarly angled wider white stripe,
succeeded by an area of black. The central field of
black is bordered on top by an “X” figure formed of
the same gray/white/black multistripe that appears at
the bottom, with the colors reversed. Above the “X”
is a field of white; the wedges at either side of the
“X” are subdivided horizontally into approximately
equal-sized wedges of black over white.75
The descriptions are likely to matter in a lot of these cases,
because at different levels of generality the purportedly separable
features are going to look more like works of authorship that could
be imagined apart—or more like representations of the platonic
form of the useful article.
The majority waves its hand at this issue, simply asserting in a
footnote that no features of a shovel could be imagined separately,
because they would just represent a shovel.76 But, in my view,
Justice Breyer is obviously correct that, given the low standard of
74

Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 491 (6th Cir.

2015).
75

Joint Appendix at *140, Varsity Brands, 2016 WL 3924018. Chances are
that Varsity intended this very granular claiming strategically to convince the
Copyright Office to register something that might otherwise have been seen as
lacking authorship or originality, possibly for being a useful article as clothing.
By being very granular about its contribution, Varsity (probably correctly)
thought the Copyright Office was more likely to acknowledge an original and
copyrightable contribution.
76
Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1002 n.2.
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originality, any feature of a shovel described with sufficient
particularity could be “imagined” as a separate work, at least unless
we are to layer the analysis with some determination of whether
those features, standing alone, necessarily “bring along” the useful
article.77
All of that is to say that I think Star Athletica is going to put lots
of pressure on courts to start thinking more about claiming
methodology in useful article cases.
II. SCOPE78
The second major dimension I want to address is the problem of
determining the scope of admittedly valid rights. Obviously, the
difficulty of nailing down scope is, in some significant part, the
result of a lack of clarity about what is claimed. Indeed, the claiming
problems I identified before can allow parties to act strategically,
sometimes even within a case, emphasizing some aspects of a design
for some purposes (validity) and other aspects for other purposes
(infringement).
But the difficulty of identifying the boundaries of the claimed
property then combines with challenges in delineating the penumbra
of rights associated with that claim. To oversimplify this, I mean to
say that there are two levels of difficulty in doing the comparison
between the accused product and the claimed design. The first is
figuring out what the claimed design is, so that we know to what we
are supposed to compare the accused product. The second is
determining how broadly we will enforce rights in that claimed
design—how far beyond identity will we go.
The identification of the claimed property is supposed to be an
input into a validity determination; we analyze the validity of the
claimed design, trade dress, or work. As I noted earlier, every area
of IP allows parties to claim rights in works or inventions that are
only marginally protectable – they all allow protection for works
that consist in some substantial part of components which, by
themselves and sometimes even in particular combinations, would
not be protectable.
77
78

25.

Id. at 1033. (Breyer, J. dissenting).
Portions of this section are adapted from Lemley & McKenna, supra note
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But our willingness to protect those works or inventions despite
their many unprotectable parts is supposed to be counterbalanced by
a recognition that the scope of rights in them is correspondingly
narrow. That is to say that there’s an institutional design choice with
respect to how to treat complex works with many unprotectable
parts. We could aggressively disqualify them from protection
because of the unprotectable elements, thereby saving ourselves a
lot of concern about tailoring protection but also eliminating a
number of things that have at least some marginally inventive,
original, or source-indicating matter. Or we could let most of those
works qualify for protection in recognition of their marginal
contribution, but then have to deal with the consequences of that
approach when we evaluate infringement.
With the exception of utilitarian functionality in trademark
law—at least as applied in most courts—IP law has chosen the latter
approach.79 Concerned about underprotecting even marginal
contributions, we rarely rule things out categorically and instead put
all of the pressure on scope. But it turns out that, as Mark Lemley
and I have described, courts often have a difficult time making good
on the promise of narrow scope.80
Take, for example, Reynolds Consumer Products v. Handi-Foil
Corp.81 In that case, Reynolds objected to the packaging of a new
line of Handi-Foil aluminum foil products. Reynolds claimed to own
rights in the “overall look, feel and commercial impression of its
Reynolds Wrap packaging design,” which it described as consisting
of:
(a) the color scheme; (b) the use of the color scheme; (c) the
use of prominent lettering within the blue section; (d) the use
of silver bands to separate the blue and pink sections; (e) the
placement of the quantity information; (f) the inclusion of
the “made in the U.S.A.” lettering; (g) the repetition of the
color scheme and type on the ends of the boxes; (h) the
“press here to lock” feature at the ends of the boxes; (i) the
use of graphics with how-to information; (j) the “Lift”
79

See generally, Lemley & McKenna, supra note 25.
Id.
81
See Reynolds Consumer Prods., Inc. v. Handi-Foil Corp., No. 1:13–CV–
214, 2014 WL 3615853 (E.D. Va. July 18, 2014).
80
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graphic; (k) the positioning of the brand name on the top flap
of the box; and (l) the color yellow, placement, and text used
to caution the consumer.82
Though the court noted that trade dress with more elements is
supposed to have narrower scope, it never addressed validity or
attempted to identify the features that made the Reynolds trade dress
protectable. It simply compared Handi-Foil’s and Reynolds’s
packages and concluded that “the similarity between the overall
impressions” was “striking.”83

Figure 10: Image Comparison of Plaintiff’s Reynolds Wrap and
Defendant’s Handi-Foil.84
In fact, the court thought the similarities between the two
packaging designs were striking “even if the boxes’ color schemes
[were] put aside.”85 What were the damning similarities?
The two boxes both say “non-stick” and “heavy duty.” The
Reynolds box says “foods lift right off!” and the Handi-Foil
box says “Food Easily Lifts Off!” Both boxes place the
(identical) square footage on the right end of the box, with
the metric conversions typed neatly below. Additionally, the
two-dimensional images above cannot capture the similarity
of the boxes’ side and end panels, all of which bear striking
semblance. Add to these characteristics the “Made in USA”
language on the right portion of the boxes in Example No.
1.86

82

Id. at *11.
Id. at *9.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
83
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The obvious problem here is that the elements of similarity
called out by the court were not even elements of the trade dress
articulated by Reynolds, very likely because those elements almost
certainly were not things Reynolds was entitled to own. Phrases like
“Food Easily Lifts Off” and “Made in the USA” are clearly
descriptive, so any rights Reynolds owned in relation to the phrases
must have been related to the particular stylization—which HandiFoil did not copy. When one limits the trade dress in the Reynolds
Wrap packaging to only the sorts of things Reynolds is legally
entitled to own, the similarities disappear.
These scope challenges are to some extent a consequence of the
infringement tests themselves. Having moved away from the point
of novelty test, for example, courts in design patent cases no longer
highlight the protectable features, simply asking factfinders to
compare the accused design to the claimed design “in light of the
prior art,”87 which can allow for slippage between validity and
infringement assessments. We see a similar result in the Reynolds
case.
But there is also a major structural dimension to the problem.
Notwithstanding the interconnectedness of the various scope
questions courts must address, those questions arise in different
parts of the tripartite case structure typically associated with IP
cases: validity, infringement, defenses. The result of this separation
is a number of disconnects—circumstances in which the law should
reach a consistent scope result but fails to do so because each IP
doctrine assumes that others will take care of the problem. First,
different decisionmakers decide different doctrines, often at
different times. Judges and juries sometimes have fundamentally
different approaches to similar questions, and the gaps are even
more likely when the jury hears only part of the story because the
judge has already decided other parts. Second, even if the
decisionmaker is the same, validity, infringement, and defenses
often come with different burdens of proof and different allocations
of those burdens. For example, registered IP rights are all presumed
87

See, e.g., Egyptian Goddess v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 676 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (“When the differences between the claimed and accused design are viewed
in light of the prior art, the attention of the hypothetical ordinary observer will be
drawn to those aspects of the claimed design that differ from the prior art.”).
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valid when challenged in court; the standard of proof differs from a
preponderance of the evidence in copyright and trademark cases to
clear and convincing evidence in patent and design patent cases.88
Proving infringement is the IP owner’s burden, always by a
preponderance of the evidence; proving a defense is a defendant’s
burden, and again the level of proof required may differ by doctrine
and defense.89 Third, courts and juries are often reluctant to
invalidate IP rights.90 When validity and infringement are separated,
the reluctance of courts to invalidate an IP right altogether means
that they find it hard to reach the right result when the tools for
limiting the right are classed as invalidity or general defenses rather
than infringement doctrines or conduct-specific defenses. When, for
example, courts understand aesthetic functionality as an all-ornothing validity doctrine, they are reluctant to use it in individual
cases in which that particular defendant has a strong competitive
need to use the feature, even if others wouldn’t have the same
need.91
All of these problems exist even if no one tries to exploit these
gaps. They are inherent disconnects between the rules of validity,
infringement, and defenses. But parties inevitably seek to exploit
them for their own advantage, often by trying to separate the
determination of validity from the determination of infringement,
either by having them done at separate times or by different
decisionmakers. Whenever the two are separated, IP owners argue
in the validity context that the rights are quite narrow and therefore
valid, but then turn around in the infringement context and
emphasize the breadth of their rights. Accused infringers do the
reverse.
88

See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 25, at 2222–23.
Id. at 2221 n.88 (“Inequitable conduct in patent law, for instance, requires
proof by the defendant by clear and convincing evidence . . . Most other defenses
require a defendant to show only a preponderance of the evidence.”); see also
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1287–1291 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (en banc).
90
See Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 71, 103 (2013) (arguing that courts are often too willing to
resolve cases on infringement grounds even when the IP right should be invalid).
91
See, e.g., Au–Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d
1062, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006).
89
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Utility patent law tries to limit that strategic behavior, and to
eliminate the gaps between validity and infringement, by use of a
Markman hearing.92 There are, of course, plenty of concerns about
the way Markman hearings are actually used,93 but they have one
significant virtue: they put the scope question front and center and
settle on the scope of the right once and for all—a claim scope that
then is held constant for validity and infringement purposes.
We lack a similar mechanism for constraining strategic behavior
in other areas of IP, even though we should have all the same
concerns about that outside of utility patent law.
III. COSTS OF DIFFICULTIES WITH CLAIMING AND SCOPE
Some of the costs associated with difficulties identifying the
claimed subject matter and delineating the scope of a party’s rights
are pretty obvious. They generally make it more difficult for parties
to determine what others own, either so that they can steer clear of
the protected matter or seek a license, if it’s a setting in which
licensing would be possible. That means we are likely to have
inefficiencies in multiple directions: risk-averse licensing when
licenses are not needed, and inefficient designing around when
copying would have been legitimate or, perhaps, when there was a
deal to be had.
Another type of cost persists even when there has been a
licensing relationship. Licenses very commonly refer to legally
defined rights when identifying the subject of the license—referring
to particular design patents or to trade dress, for example. To the
extent such a reference to legally-defined subject matter imports
ambiguity regarding the boundaries of the licensed matter, parties
may wind up fighting over whether conduct violates a license even
when they mean to abide by it. I’ll just use one example here, namely
the case of Premium Balloon Accessories, Inc. v. Creative Balloons
Mfg., Inc.94
Premium and Creative both made balloon accessories, including
balloon weights, which are objects that weigh down helium balloons
92

Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 384–87 (1996).
See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 25, at 2269–71.
94
573 F. App’x. 547 (6th Cir. 2014).
93
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so they don't fly away.95 Premium had previously sued Creative,
alleging that Creative's balloon weights infringed Premium's tradedress rights in four of its balloon weights, including a star-shaped
weight. The parties entered into a settlement agreement under which
Creative agreed to pay Premium for “a fully paid-up license under
the trade dress that was the subject of the Complaint.”96 Soon after
the agreement was signed, Premium began manufacturing a new
star-shaped “Heavy Weight” balloon weight, which was similar in
appearance to the star-shaped weight that it already sold except that
it was thicker and heavier.97 In 2009, Creative introduced a similar
weight to the market, calling it the “SuperStar” balloon weight.98
You can see what’s coming here—Premium sued Creative for
infringing the trade dress of its new star-shaped Heavy Weight.99
Creative argued that it had a license to use Premium's design under
the previous settlement agreement, and that the new design was
similar enough to the old design to be covered under that license
agreement.100
The Sixth Circuit ultimately agreed with Creative that it had a
license to use Premium's trade dress in certain balloon weight
products, including its lighter star-shaped weight, and that the new
star-shaped Heavy Weight used essentially the same trade dress as
the star-shaped weight the design of which Creative licensed, albeit
with minor, primarily functional modifications, such as for size and
weight.101
But the parties had to litigate this case to the Sixth Circuit to
understand the scope of the design rights reflected in the license.
Indeed, the District Court had concluded that Creative’s new design
was not the same as the old design and so wasn’t covered by a
license that referred to the previous star-shaped weight.102 The
dispute was entirely about the scope of the trade dress subject to the
license. Everyone recognized it wasn’t limited to the exact shape
95

Id. at 548.
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 549.
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Premium Balloon Accessories, Inc. v. Creative Balloons Mfg., Inc., No.
1:10CV979, 2013 WL 3947191 (N.D. Ohio July 31, 2013).
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previously used, but the scope of the design covered by the license
was unclear, leaving the court with two difficult questions: (1) was
Creative’s weight sufficiently different from the designs under the
license such that the new weight was not covered by the license?;
and (2) was the new weight also sufficiently similar to Premium’s
new trade dress—which was very similar to its previous design—
such that it could be considered infringing?
Let me finish by returning to something I said early on—these
claiming issues create enough scope problems even if we just think
about each of these areas of law in isolation. But it would be a
mistake only to consider them in isolation, because it is so common
for parties to assert multiple forms of rights with respect to the same
design.
Take, for example, Deckers’s case against H&M.103 In that case,
Deckers alleged that H&M infringed a design patent covering
various aspects of the design of Deckers’s UGG boots:

Figure 11: Image Comparison of Allegedly Infringing Product and
Design Patent D599,999.
Deckers also claimed that H&M infringed its trade dress rights
in the Bailey Boot, which it described as follows:
• Classic suede boot styling made famous by the
UGG® Brand;
103
Deckers Outdoor Corp. v. H&M Hennes & Maurtiz, L.P., No. 2:17–cv–
00103. (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2017).
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Overlapping of front and rear panels on lateral side
of the boot shaft;
Curved top edges on the overlapping panels;
Exposed fleece-type lining edging the overlapping
panels and top of the boot shaft; and
One or more buttons (depending on the height of the
boot) prominently featured on the lateral side of the
boot shaft adjacent the overlapping panels.104

That is to say that Deckers asserted that the same H&M boots
infringed both the design patent and the trade dress.105 Indeed, it
lined them all up side by side in the complaint:

Figure 12: Image Comparison of Defendant’s Allegedly Infringing
Products and Deckers’s Bailey Button Boot and Design Patent
D599,999.
Here’s the piece I want to highlight: the design patent and the
trade dress refer, ostensibly, to the same design, but there are some
interesting and notable differences in the claims. In some ways, the
trade dress claim is obviously broader than the patented design,
referring for example to “one or more buttons.”106 That is, the trade
dress claim is really to a line of boots, not to a particular boot
design—boots of multiple different numbers of buttons and of
different heights. The trade dress claim is also conceivably narrower
in the sense that it refers to a fleece-type lining, whereas the design
patent clearly depicts some kind of lining but doesn’t denote a
104
105
106

Id. at *4.
Id. at *4–5.
Id. at *5.

32
14:1

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS

[VOL.

material.107 To figure out what it could and couldn’t do, H&M
would have needed to layer both of those claims on top of each other
to determine their collective scope.
CONCLUSION
The problems I’ve discussed here strongly indicate the need to
put the scope question front and center in litigation, both
conceptually and structurally. That will necessarily require that we
think much more about claiming methodology in design patent,
trademark, and copyright law. I certainly don’t mean to suggest that
we would simply want to take everything that utility patent law has
done with respect to claim interpretation and import it into other
areas. Obviously, there are plenty of concerns about claim
construction methodology even in utility patent—though notably
some significant part of that has to do with utility patent law’s
emphasis on language rather than on the actual invention,108 a sort
of analogous problem to the one I’ve described. We might also have
good reasons to want to do interpretation differently in other areas
of IP. But far too much of the law dealing with claiming and scope
is being done implicitly and inconsistently now, and we would be
better off if that changed.
Finally, I think these concerns ought to make us more
uncomfortable with the extent of overlapping protection in this
context. I have been on record elsewhere arguing for greater
channeling generally in IP law.109 But the reason overlap is
particularly problematic here is that the variation in claim
interpretation and scope determinations across different areas of IP
can create significant uncertainty and opportunity for strategic
manipulation. That is an especially significant concern now, since
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the majority opinion in Star Athletica essentially dismissed concerns
about overlap, embracing the possibility of overlapping copyright
and design patent protection for design.110 To my mind, that would
be an unwelcome development that would further exacerbate the
problems I’ve identified here.
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